Captain Hindsight reporting for duty

Seattle’s decision to kick a field goal with 3:28 left in Sunday’s game isn’t the reason the Seahawks lost.

The reason Seattle lost was either the pair of completions cornerback Tariq Woolen allowed or the turnover that resulted from Seahawks right tackle Abe Lucas getting shoved into Sam Darnold in the final minute.

The Seahawks decision to kick the field goal didn’t maximize the Seahawks’ chances of winning, though, as I will explain in somewhat laborious fashion because I have become (slightly) obsessed with game management at the end of halves.

First, let’s look at the rationale for kicking the field goal:

👟 Kicking the field goal 👟 

I believe NFL coaches overvalue taking a lead in the final 5 minutes. This is a hypothesis of mine, one I plan to test over the course of this year.

In this case, I believe that Seattle’s 13-10 lead was unlikely to hold up. San Francisco not only had more than 3:25 left to work with, the 49ers have all three timeouts. Time is not really a factor yet. In fact, if the 49ers had sputtered on that next possession, they very well might have wound up getting the ball back for a second drive.

🏈 Going for it 🏈 

Scoring a touchdown is Seattle’s optimum result on this drive.

The fact that San Francisco has three timeouts would preclude the Seahawks from running out the clock even if they converted fourth-and-1 AND got a subsequent first down.

If the Seahawks score a touchdown, they can feel reasonably confident that the best San Francisco can do is tie the game on the ensuing possession.

While a field goal gives Seattle the lead, it does not provide nearly as much security. It also puts San Francisco in a situation where it has nothing to lose, which is the second thing I want to focus on.

I think NFL teams underestimate how their decisions influence their opponent’s subsequent actions. This is the second hypothesis I’ll be trying to test and tease out this year.

In this case, kicking the field goal gave Seattle a 13-10 lead and put SF in a more aggressive mode. The Niners are more likely to go for it on fourth down. They’re going to throw the ball down the field. They’ll take more risks because the downside of giving Seattle good field position is no longer relevant. If the Niners don’t score, they’re going to lose. Doesn’t matter if they lose by three or by six or by 10.

In a tie game, teams must be more conscious of the downside of their decisions. The actions you take in hopes of winning the game are counterbalanced by the possibility that a mistake could lose it for you.

This game shows that quite clearly. The Niners longest gain of the game came on their second play of the ensuing drive, as receiver Ricky Pearsall ran a double move on Tariq Woolen, who did not bite, but rather misjudged the ball, allowing Pearsall to come down with a 45-yard gain. Just like that, San Francisco had the ball at Seattle 22 with 2:30 left.

San Francisco scored its go-ahead touchdown with 1:34 remaining. The extra-point put the Niners ahead 17-13.

The Seahawks needed to score a touchdown to avoid losing.

On the third play of Seattle’s ensuing drive, Sam Darnold completed a 40-yard pass to Jaxon Smith-Njigba for what was the Seahawks’ longest gain of the game.

We know how that ended: A turnover on second-and-5 from the San Francisco 9, which was the last domino in a chain reaction that got going in earnest when Macdonald opted for the field goal 3 minutes earlier.