The Mariners scored more than three runs for the first time in more than two weeks.

However, their bullpen surrendered five runs in the eighth inning in Cleveland, and the Mariners lost for the fourth time in the last five games.

It was a game that might serve as an epitaph for this season.

Or it might be one of the low points any successful team must weather.

That’s the hard thing about covering sports, especially baseball. It’s hard to identify turning points in real time. You’ve got to let things play out.

But there is one thing I can say for sure: The Mariners have a problem when it comes to managing their pitching staff.

I don’t know whether this problem stems from manager Dan Wilson or the front office, which could be prescribing the plans that Wilson follows.

I suspect that it’s the manager, though, and I say that for a couple of reasons:

  1. When Wilson was hired to replace Scott Servais, he was not designated as an interim manager. He was characterized as a replacement, and at that time, I don’t think the head of Seattle’s baseball operations — Jerry Dipoto — had the juice to install a guy to serve as a rubber stamp. I don’t think Wilson would take a job where he was just pulling the levers he was instructed to pull.

  2. Wilson doesn’t seem particularly adept at adjusting his bullpen deployment when things don’t go as planned in a given game, which is a significant part of the problem.

Regardless of who’s ultimately responsible, two things need to change. Now.

I. Abandon the piggyback
Not because the starters absolutely hate it (though they clearly do), but because the Mariners don’t have the guts to commit to it fully.

The only way you can carry six starting pitchers on the active roster is if it truly saves the team from using its bullpen in one out of every five games. If this does not happen, you will wind up short-handed in the bullpen, which is exactly what happened on Sunday.

If the Mariners had stuck to their piggyback approach, Logan Gilbert would have started Saturday and given way to Emerson Hancock. The Mariners decided not to use the piggyback, having Gilbert start on Saturday and Hancock on Sunday.

Gilbert pitched seven innings on Saturday before being replaced by Jose Ferrer, who threw the eighth. This was the second straight game Ferrer pitched, meaning he was unavailable on Sunday, which is why you saw Mike Rucker summoned in a leverage situation in the eighth. Ugh.

Seattle’s insistence on carrying six starting pitchers is what created this reality.

II. Stage an intervention on bullpen deployment

Summoning Eduard Bazardo to get one out in the sixth, knowing this would leave the team relying upon Rucker in the eighth, was terrible game management.

The fact that Bazardo was fresh, having not pitched Friday or Saturday, made it worse. So did the fact that he wound up facing the No. 8 and No. 9 slots in the Cleveland lineup.

Let’s go back to the moment of the decision:

With two outs in the bottom of the sixth, Hancock walked Cooper Ingle. At this point, the Mariners led 4-1, the No. 8 slot in Cleveland’s order was up, and Hancock had thrown 98 pitches.

Which of the following scenarios gives Seattle the best chance at winning:

a) Let Hancock try and get the final out of the sixth, leaving Gabe Speier, Eduardo Bazardo and Andrés Muñoz to get the final nine outs of the game;

or

b) Summon Bazardo to close out the sixth, throw Speier in the seventh, and bring on somebody named Mike Rucker to get the game to Muñoz?

Now, I suppose it’s possible that Hancock had a hard pitch count here. That he was not — under any circumstances — to surpass 100 pitches. But even if that’s the case, I'm not sure you should burn Bazardo in the bottom of the sixth given there’s no runner in scoring position and Cleveland’s bringing a pinch-hitter to the plate.

The plight of the modern manager

Over the past 40 years, no position in professional sports has become more devalued than that of the baseball manager. Back in the 1970s, the managers were considered as important and prominent as the players themselves, sometimes more so.

Now, they’re expected to be automatons who can either calculate or intuit the highest-percentage plays in any given moment.

The job is not nearly that easy.

For one, the managers have WAY more information to consider than we know, most especially when it comes to the health of the team’s pitchers. They must consider how the guy is feeling that day, the recent workload, and the overall trajectory for the season ahead. This is made more difficult because pitchers are not always – or perhaps ever – honest about their arms getting tired.

Secondly, you have to consider your players’ feelings and psychology. It doesn’t mean you have to cater to them or do what they want, but you do need to be able to explain things to them.

If a manager fails to provide a plan for how that player will be used or fails to explain why certain decisions were made, you can lose the confidence of your players.

I’m not saying that’s what’s happening with these Mariners.

But it might be, which is why those two changes need to be made, stat.

Reply

Avatar

or to participate

Keep Reading